On the CARM the atheists are using the fortress of facts again. The fortress of facts is a rhetorical strategy used by atheist, a type of argument. We have this big pile of facts and there is not even one fact that supports Christianity. Even though every time I bring it up a huge percentage of atheists say "O we don't do this. we never say this." I can show about a half dozen instances where it is used on the board just today.
"what was God thinking" as a thread is rife what this notion.
Fortress of facts = science is a big pile of facts all them support materialism so theism is proved and there' no facts at all to prove God.
Here's the problems with it:
(1) scientific facts self selected by atheist to reflect ideology.
They are all facts that are purposely selected to reflect the atheist views. When facts that support religious views are brought up their status s scientific is immediately put in question so that it appears there are no facts that don't support atheist view.
such as 200 empirical studies from academic journals showing that religious expedience results in transformational effects and this immediately denounced without ever having read a single study.
(2) Atheist Begg the question where gaps of knowledge are concerned
God is beyond the nature of our observations, as of cousre he must be becuase he's the basis of all reality. So this is what I would expect from a world created by God, that God would be too big too see and beyond our understanding so that we have to seek truth through a variety of means.
atheists seek to reduce knowledge to one source, science, when they imagine they can control so that they can route all knowledge their their ideology and thus create the illusion of no evidence for God.
Thus they beg the question where there are gaps in knowledge and assume the gap is filled with naturalistic reality becuase that's their assumption. What this amounts to is laughing away the notions of God beyond our understanding as though this is always an excuse not to offer proof when in reality they are using their question begging techniques to cover up the proof.
(3) The use of doubt as proof
Most atheist have only one argument but it has a variety of forms. that argument is form incredulity. I refuse to bleieve, therefore, it can't be true.
The major upshot of this argument is that they use doubt as proof. The fill the gaps of knowledge with the assumption that becuase they doubt they have disproved belief. Thus the wield doubt as a fact and all postie information they interpret as concrete proofs of this principle.
this was part 2 of dealing with the fortress of facts, that's why the FN begin with 15.
In reality all these done is beg the question.
Not Facts but Verisimilitude:
Karl
Popper (1902-1994) is one of the most renewed and highly respected
figures in the philosophy of science. Popper was from Vienna, of Jewish
origin, maintained a youthful flirtation with Marxism, and left his
native land due to the rise of Nazism in the late thirties. He is
considered to be among the ranks of the greatest philosophers of the
twentieth century. Popper is highly respected by scientists in a way
that most philosophers of science are not.[15]
He
was also a social and political philosopher of considerable stature, a
self-professed ‘critical-rationalist’, a dedicated opponent of all
forms of scepticism, conventionalism, and relativism in science and in
human affairs generally, a committed advocate and staunch defender of
the ‘Open Society’, and an implacable critic of totalitarianism in all
of its forms. One of the many remarkable features of Popper's thought
is the scope of his intellectual influence. In the modern technological
and highly-specialised world scientists are rarely aware of the work
of philosophers; it is virtually unprecedented to find them queuing up,
as they have done in Popper's case, to testify to the enormously
practical beneficial impact which that philosophical work has had upon
their own. But notwithstanding the fact that he wrote on even the most
technical matters with consummate clarity, the scope of Popper's work
is such that it is commonplace by now to find that commentators tend to
deal with the epistemological, scientific and social elements of his
thought as if they were quite disparate and unconnected, and thus the
fundamental unity of his philosophical vision and method has to a large
degree been dissipated.[16]
Unfortunately
for our purposes we will only be able to skim the surface of Popper’s
thoughts on the most crucial aspect of this theory of science, that
science is not about proving things but about falsifying them.
Above
we see that Dawkins, Stenger and company place their faith in the
probability engineered by scientific facts. The problem is probability
is not the basis upon which one chooses one theory over another, at
least according to Popper. This insight forms the basis of this notion
that science can give us verisimilitude not “facts.” Popper never uses
the phrase “fortress of facts,” we could add that, science is not a
fortress of facts. Science is not giving us “truth,” its’ giving
something in place of truth, “verisimilitude.” The term verisimilar means “having the appearance of truth, or probable.” Or it can also mean “depicting realism” as in art or literature.”[17]
According to Popper in choosing between two theories one more probable
than the other, if one is interested I the informative content of the
theory, one should choose the less probable. This is paradoxical but
the reason is that probability and informative content very inversely.
The higher informative content of a theory is more predictive since the
more information contained in a statement the greater the number of
ways the statement will turn out to fail or be proved wrong. At that
rate mystical experience should be the most scientific view point. If
this dictum were applied to a choice between Stenger’s atheism and
belief in God mystical God belief would be more predictive and have
less likelihood of being wrong because it’s based upon not speaking
much about what one experiences as truth. We will see latter that this
is actually the case in terms of certain kinds of religious
experiences. I am not really suggesting that the two can be compared.
They are two different kinds of knowledge. Even though mystical
experience per se can be falsified (which will be seen in subsequent
chapters) belief in God over all can’t be. The real point is that
arguing that God is less probable is not a scientifically valid
approach.
Thus
the statements which are of special interest to the scientist are
those with a high informative content and (consequentially) a low
probability, which nevertheless come close to the truth. Informative
content, which is in inverse proportion to probability, is in direct
proportion to testability. Consequently the severity of the test to
which a theory can be subjected, and by means of which it is falsified
or corroborated, is all-important.[18]
Scientific
criticism of theories must be piecemeal. We can’t question every
aspect of a theory at once. For this reason one must accept a certain
amount of background knowledge. We can’t have absolute certainty.
Science is not about absolute certainty, thus rather than speak of
“truth” we speak of “verisimilitude.” No single observation can be
taken to falsify a theory. There is always the possibility that the
observation is mistaken, or that the assumed background knowledge is
faulty.[19]
Uneasy with speaking of “true” theories or ideas, or that a
corroborated theory is “true,” Popper asserted that a falsified theory
is known to be false. He was impressed by Tarski’s 1963 reformulation of
the corresponded theory of truth. That is when Popper reformulated his
way of speaking to frame the concept of “truth-likeness” or
“verisimilitude,” according to Thronton.[20]
I wont go into all the ramifications of verisimilitude, but Popper has
an extensive theory to cover the notion. Popper’s notions of
verisimilitude were critixized by thinkers in the 70’s such as Miller,
Tichy’(grave over the y) and Grunbaum (umlaut over the first u) brought
out problems with the concept. In an attempt to repair the theory
Popper backed off claims to being able to access the numerical levels
of verisimilitude between two theories.[21]
The resolution of this problem has not diminished the admiration for
Popper or his acceptance in the world of philosophy of science. Nor is
the solution settled in the direction of acceptance for the fortress of
facts. Science is not closer to the fact making business just because
there are problems with verisimilitude.
Science doesn’t prove but Falsifies
The aspect of Popper’s theory for which he is best known is probably the idea of falsification. In 1959 He published the Logic of Scientific Discovery in
which he rigorously and painstakingly demonstrated why science can’t
prove but can only disprove, or falsify. Popper begins by observing that
science uses inductive methods and thus is thought to be marked and
defined by this approach. By the use of the inductive approach science
moves from “particular statements,” such as the result of an experiment,
to universal statements such as an hypothesis or theories. Yet, Popper
observes, the fallacy of this kind of reasoning has always been known.
Regardless of how many times we observe white swans “this does not
justify the conclusion that all swans are white.”[22]
He points out this is the problem of universal statements, which can’t
be grounded in experience because experience is not universal, at
least not human experience. One might observe this is also a problem of
empirical observation. Some argue that we can know universal
statements to be true by experience; this is only true if the
experiences are universal as well. Such experience can only be a
singular statement. This puts it in the same category with the original
problem so it can’t do any better.[23]
The only way to resolve the problem of induction, Popper argues, is to
establish a principle of induction. Such a principle would be a
statement by which we could put inductive inferences into logically
acceptable form. He tells us that upholders of the need for such a
principle would say that without science can’t provide truth or
falsehood of its theories.[24]
The
principle can’t be a purely logical statement such as tautology or a
prori reasoning, if it could there would be no problem of induction.
This means it must be a synthetic statement, empirically derived. Then he asked “how can we justify statement on rational grounds?” [25]
After all he’s just demonstrated that an empirical statement can’t be
the basis of a universal principle. Then to conclude that there must be
a universal principle of logic that justifies induction knowing that
it ahs to be an empirical statement, just opens up the problem again.
He points out that Reichenbach[26] would point that such the principle of induction is accepted by all of science.[27] Against Reinchenback he sties Hume.[28] Popper glosses over Kant’s attempt at a prori justification of syetnic a priori statements.[29]
In the end Popper disparages finding a solution and determines that
induction is not the hallmark of science. Popper argues that truth
alludes science since it’s only real ability is to produce probability.
Probability and not truth is what science can produce. “…but scientific
statements can only attain continuous degrees of probability whose
unattainable upper and lower limits are truth and falsity’.”[30] He goes on to argue against probability as a measure of inductive logic.[31]
Then he’s going to argue for an approach he calls “deductive method of
testing.. In this case he argues that an hypothesis can only be
empirically tested and only after it has been advanced. [32]
What
has been established so far is enough to destroy the fortress of facts
of idea. The defeat of a principle of induction as a means of
understanding truth is primary defeat for the idea that science is going
about establishing a big pile of facts. What
all of this is driving at of course is the idea that science is not so
much the process of fact discovery as it is the process of elimination
of bad idea taken as fact. Science doesn’t prove facts it disproves
hypotheses.. Falsifying theories is the real business of science. It’s
the comparison to theory in terms of what is left after falsification
has been done that makes for a seeming ‘truth-likeness,’ or
verisimilitude. Falsification is a branch of what Popper calls
“Demarcation.” This issue refers to the domain or the territory of the
scientists work. Induction does not mark out the proper demarcation. The
criticism he is answering in discussing demarcation is that removing
induction removes for science it’s most important distinction from
metaphysical speculation. He states that this is precisely his reason
for rejecting induction because “it does not provide a suitable
distinguishing mark of the empirical non metaphysical character of a
theoretical system,”[33] this is what he calls “demarcation.”
Popper
writes with reference to positivistic philosophers as the sort of
umpires of scientific mythology. He was a philosopher and the project of
the positivists was to “clear away the clutter” (in the words of A.J.
Ayer) for science so it could get on with it’s work. Positivistic
philosophers were the janitors of science. Positivists had developed the
credo that “meaningful statements” (statements of empirical science)
must be statements that are “fully decided.” That is to say, they had to
be both falsifiable and verifiable. The
requirement for verifiable is really a requirement similar to the
notion of proving facts, or truth. Verifiability is not the same thing
as facticiy or proof it’s easy to see how psychologically it reinforces
th sense that science is about proving things. He quotes several
positivists in reinforcing this idea: Thus Schlick says: “. . . a
genuine statement must be capable of conclusive verification” Waismann
says, “If there is no possible way to determine whether a statement is
true then that statement has no meaning whatsoever. For the meaning of a
statement is the method of its verification.”[34]
Yet Popper disagrees with them. He writes that there is no such thing
as induction. He discusses particular statements which are verified by
experience just opens up the same issues he launched in the beginning
one cannot derive universal statements from experience. “Therefore,
theories are never theories are never empirically verifiable. He argues
that the only way to deal with the demarcation problem is to admit
statements that are not empirically verified.[35]
But I shall certainly admit a system as empirical or scientific only if it
is capable of being tested by experience. These considerations suggest
that not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a
criterion of demarcation. In other words: I shall not require of a
Scientific system that it shall be capable of being singled out, once and
for all, in a positive sense; but I shall require that its logical form shall
be such that it can be singled out, by means of empirical tests, in a
negative sense: it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience.[36]
What
this means in relation to the “fortress of facts” idea is that it
transgresses upon the domain of science. Compiling a fortress of facts
is beyond the scope of science and also denudes science of it’s domain.
He
deals with the objection that science is supposed to give us positive
knowledge and to reduce it to a system of falsification only negates
its major purpose. He deals with this by saying this criticism carries
little weight since the amount of positive information is greater the
more likely it is to clash. The reason being laws of nature get more
done the more they act as a limit on possibility, in other words, he
puts it, “not for nothing do we call the laws of nature laws. They more
they prohibit the more they say.”[37]
[15] Steven Thornton, “Karl Popper,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2011 edition Edward N. Zalta Editor, URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/popper/ vested 2/6/2012
[16] ibid
[17] Miriam-Webster. M-W.com On line version of Webster’s dictionary. URL: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/verisimilar?show=0&t=1328626983 visited 2/7/2012
[18] Thornton, ibid.
[19] ibid
[20] ibid
[21] ibid
[22]
Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London, New
York:Routledge Classics, original English publication 1959 by Hutchison
and co. by Routldege 1992. On line copy URL: http://www.cosmopolitanuniversity.ac/library/LogicofScientificDiscoveryPopper1959.pdf digital copy by Cosmo oedu visited 2/6/2012, p4
[23] ibid
[24] ibid
[25] ibid, 5
[26] Hans
Reinchenbach (1891-1953) German philosopher, attended Einstein’s
lectures and contributed to work on Quantum Mechanics. He fled Germany to escape Hitler wound up teaching at UCLA.
[27] Popper, ibid, referece to , H. Reichenbach, Erkenntnis 1, 1930, p. 186 (cf. also pp. 64 f.). Cf. the penultimate paragraph of Russell’s chapter xii, on Hume, in his History of Western Philosophy, 1946,
p. 699.
[28] ibid, Popper, 5
[29] ibid, 6
[30] ibid 6
[31] ibid, 7
[32] ibid
[33] ibid 11
[34] ibid, 17, references to Schlick, Naturwissenschaften 19, 1931, p. 150. and Waismann, Erkenntnis 1, 1903, p. 229.
[35] Ibid 18
[36] ibid
[37] ibid, 19 the quotation about laws is found on p 19 but the over all argument is developed over sections 31-46 spanning pages 95-133.
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