If she’s defining the word “faith” the same way as the Biblical book of Hebrews does (“confidence in what we hope for and assurance about what we do not see”), then she’s wrong to assume that “atheists,” without qualification, hope that no God or gods exist and that there is no afterlife. Yes, there are some atheists who hope for those things, but there are other atheists who hope for the opposite, and many more atheists who are indifferent. But if she’s defining the word “faith” to mean “belief without evidence” or even “belief against the (weight of the total) evidence,” then she’s mistaken.
If N is true, then atheism is true by definition because N denies the existence of all supernatural beings, including God. So one way to defend atheism is to defend N. And one way to defend N is to present evidence which is more probable on the assumption that N is true than on the assumption that theism (T) is true.
I'm having trouble seeing exactly what that proves. Its not demonstrating the truth of naturism, it's only showing the propositioning are more probable if we assume naturalism. is more probable if we assume naturalism s true, it's not like these are true because naturalism is more probable. Why should we assume naturalism? Surely not because the propositions are probable since we have to assume naturalism to make them seem more so, why should we do it?
Here is his first one:
1. The Existence of the Universe
The universe–which may be defined as the sum total of all matter, energy, space, and time–exists. This fact is entailed by N: if N is true, then by definition the physical universe exists. But, although logically consistent with T, this fact is not entailed by T. If T is true, God could create the universe, but God could also choose not to create the universe. Thus, contrary to the claims of both the Leibnizian and kalam versions of the cosmological argument, the existence of the physical universe is more probable on N than on T.In formal terms, the argument may be formulated as follows. If we let B be our background information; E be the existence of the universe; then the explanatory argument is as follows:(1) E is known to be true, i.e., Pr(E) is close to 1.(2) T is not intrinsically much more probable than N, i.e., Pr(|T|) is not much more probable than Pr(|N|).(3) Pr(E | N & B) =1 > Pr(E | T & B).(4) Other evidence held equal, T is probably false, i.e., Pr(T | B & E) < 1/2.
There are a couple of problems I see here. Mind you I may not understand it.I'm just doing my best in my little mine sweeper against his battle ship. First, "God could create the universe, but God could also choose not to create the universe. Thus, contrary to the claims of both the Leibnizian and kalam versions of the cosmological argument, the existence of the physical universe is more probable on N than on T." I think that would only be true if the universe is deterministic and had to be. We don't know that ,Moreover, we don't know why there is a universe. No reason to think the universe had to be. Davies says it didn't.  Cosmological arguments are optional. They are not mandatory so if it's a choice between God or the cosmological argument we can throw the argument away. But that's not necessary because the universe is not necessary.
2. The “Anti-Creation Ex Nihilo Argument”
This argument may be summarized as follows:
(1) Everything that had a beginning comes from pre-existing material.
(2) The universe had a beginning.(3) Therefore, the universe came from pre-existing material.Now I think it is far from certain that (2) is true. Let’s make a distinction between:(2a) The expansion/inflation of the universe had a beginning.and:
(2b) The universe itself had a beginning, viz., the universe began to exist.It appears that (2a) is accepted by the vast majority of cosmologists. So let’s assume not only that (2a) is true, but that we know (2a) is true with certainty. It doesn’t follow that (2b) is true. In fact, as far as I can tell, (2b) does not enjoy the same widespread consensus among cosmologists as (2a) does. So there is reasonable doubt about (2b). But (2), like its theistic counterpart in the kalam cosmological argument, requires that (2b) is true. Because there is reasonable doubt about (2b), there is also reasonable doubt about (2).
But what if both (1) and (2b) are true? In that case, it would follow that (3) is true. But (3) entails the universe was not created ex nihilo, viz., created from (absolute) nothing. The falsity of creation ex nihilo is entailed by N (and physical reality’s existence is factually necessary and uncreated), but extremely unlikely (if not impossible) on T (and physical reality was either created ex nihilo or created ex deo [out of the being of God]).
(1) if by "Material" we mean matter, p1 is fallacious. We don't know the cause of the universe.
(2) fallacy of composition; just because all the individual bits are produced by matter that doesn't mean the whole is.
We could also think about this argument in non Christian ways, I'ts Christian doctrine that says creation is ex nihilo that does not mean that doctrine is necessary for all belief in God. Then it's just as matter of what we mean by natter, Is energy natter? We don't really know what matter is made of. we don't know what the singularity was made of it may be that a naturalistic origination yield naturalism.
Don't forget to check out the comments where I answer a bunch of hsi 25 I'll do more next time.
Jeff Lowder, "25 Lines of evidence Against st theism," Secular Outpost, (June 26,2016) online blog URL - See more at:http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2016/06/26/pererz1-25-evidences-against-theism/#sthash.PsSPRwSt.dpuf
[3 ] Anthony Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy,St. Martin's Griffin; Revised edition, 1984
, "Process, Theology," The Westminster Dictionary of Christian... op cit 467-468God is diboplar. What is real of God and not merely potential is in process.God is changing alomng with creation, That put's gpd cpomsequnt pol owthin the naturalistic peocess.
First Things: Physics and the Mind of God: The Templeton Prize Address (1999)
 Joseph Hinman, "Can Science Really Prove The Basis of Modern Physics." Metacrock's Blog
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 01, 2016 HTTP://METACROCK.BLOGSPOT.COM/2016/02/CAN-SCIENCE-REALLY-PROVE-BASIS-OF.HTML ACCESS 6/27/16