Friday, April 29, 2016

challenge to athyeists especially Martyn Cornell

Atheism analyzed is a site I dislike. His political views suck and he uses them more than he analyses atheism. A friend, JPspfn, alerted me to an exchange where an atheist claims to have read my God arguments and argues against them. Rather he dismisses them without really understanding them.


Martyn Cornell said...
JBsptfn: I've read all those arguments before, thanks. They all boil down to: "We can't think of another answer so it must be god." And many actually have two possible answers. Apparent fine tuning? Could be god - but could be the multiverse. Overall - not good enough. And exactly the same failing applies to the attempt to answer the "no proof" attack: "I can't think of another explanation for my mystical feelings, so it must be god." Again, not good enough. Incidentally, that page is in shocking need of a good copy editor: it's almost unreadable, the typos are so bad.

They get onto Fine Tuning and multiverse
It's 200 and something comments, mine is qt the bottom but zi domnt actually expect anyone to read them, just for docs:
 
Martyn Cornell said...
“There is precisely NO evidence for a multiverse”

But nor is there any evidence that an immaterial being can call into effect, and affect, our material world: only your assertion that it must be so, because you can’t think of any other explanation. I fail to find evidence-free assertion convincing.

There appear to be three choices: the start of the material world was caused by an immaterial being; the start of the material world had no cause; or there was, in fact, no start. You seem to be rejecting that last one because it’s unprovable: but plenty of unprovable things are still true. I’m not saying the infinite multiverse IS true: but it certainly seems more parsimonious as an explanation than the idea of an immaterial being that can affect the material.
Martyn Cornell said...
Oh, and by the way: "Kimura proved that the only mutations to be passed along are deleterious, not beneficial." - no he didn't.
Joe Hinman said...
Martyn Cornell said...
“There is precisely NO evidence for a multiverse”

But nor is there any evidence that an immaterial being can call into effect, and affect, our material world: only your assertion that it must be so, because you can’t think of any other explanation. I fail to find evidence-free assertion convincing.

do you even know how to read? if you read my arguments as you claim to have. You probably just read the first line. Had you read my FT argument you would know that I have 26 reasons why Multiverse does not beat FT.
Joe Hinman said...
There appear to be three choices: the start of the material world was caused by an immaterial being; the start of the material world had no cause; or there was, in fact, no start.

Have you actually read anything about this topic? First you have no reason to suppose an immaterial from of being could not exist or create. Secondly being material or immaterial has nothing to do with it. Although it does seem all matter is cotangent so that's a reason to think the origin o all can't be material. Thirdly,


the start of the material world had no cause;

all material things have causes so attributing the universe to no cause is foolish,

or there was, in fact, no start.

science says there was. it's called the big bang,.

22 comments:

im-skeptical said...

Joe's cosmological argument:

(1) All contingent things have causes
(2) All contingencies require necessities to ground them.
(3) All natural things are contingent
(4) the universe is natural, therefore, the universe is contingent
(5) the universe requires a necessity upon which its existence is grounded, Therefore, the origin of the universe must be necessary.
(6)Since the origin of the universe must be necessary (from 2,4 and 5) and not contingent the origin cannot have a cause.
(7)The origin of universe is necessary and must be eternal and first cause, since this is the definition of God (see Rational Warrant page) then the origin of the universe must be God.

My response:
(1) I will grant this for the purpose of this discussion. However, is is not known to be true. There are things for which we can observe no cause.

(2) I do not accept this. Contingent things (if defined as things whose existence has a beginning in time) have a cause (by premise 1), but that cause could be anything. I do not grant that it must be a necessary thing.

(3) I do not accept this. Of course, it depends on the definition of natural, but you haven't provided that.

(4) I do not grant that the universe has a beginning in time, and therefore that the universe is contingent. Space-time may have a beginning, but since time in intimately bound with space, it is incorrect to say that the universe has a beginning in time.

(5) Since I reject premise 2, I reject this conclusion.

(6) I assume that by "the origin" you mean the thing that causes the universe to exist. That could be something that exists eternally, but there is no reason to assume that it must be a necessary thing. It could be something (other than God) that just happens to exist by brute fact. Some sort of timeless quantum vacuum, for instance.

(7) Obviously, the existence of God does not follow without making some unjustified assumptions int the premises that lead up to this. Since that justification has not been provided, the conclusion is not warranted.

Martyn Cornell said...

Have you actually read anything about this topic?

Are you capable of polite discourse?

First you have no reason to suppose an immaterial from of being could not exist or create.

I can suppose all sorts of things, but without evidence I would be foolish to rely upon pure supposition to argue anything as actual fact. Second, all beings we actually have knowledge of are material. Positing “an immaterial form of being” to get you out of trouble is pure sophistry: “Deus ex nihilo”. Third, “an immaterial being” is surely as nonsensical as “a colourless green” or “a silent noise”.

Secondly being material or immaterial has nothing to do with it. Although it does seem all matter is cotangent so that's a reason to think the origin o all can't be material.

How can the origin of the material be immaterial? You can’t even define the immaterial, let alone explain how it could act with the material. All the things we know act with the material are themselves material.

Thirdly,

the start of the material world had no cause;

all material things have causes so attributing the universe to no cause is foolish,

But the fact is, all we know is, “all the material things we know so far have cause.” That is not the same as “all material things have causes.” It’s the “all swans are white” argument: a perfectly reasonable believe for Europeans, until they reached Australia.

or there was, in fact, no start.

science says there was. it's called the big bang.

That looks to have been the start in our universe. But since we cannot look beyond the Big Bang, it might, for example, have been the Big Bounce - a position that, while (currently) impossible to prove or disprove, at least requires less illogical imagining than “an immaterial form of being”. And the eternal multiverse is at least a more logical and believable solution than “an immaterial form of being creating the material”.

Turning to your version of the cosmological argument,

(3) All natural things are contingent - all the natural things we know are contingent. “All swans are white” again. So that knocks out your (4)

(5) the universe requires a necessity upon which its existence is grounded The only necessity for the universe is that it exists. You suppose a beginning for all existence is necessary. You haven’t proved that to be the case, nor can you until you can show that there was nothing at all before the Big Bang.

Ryan M said...

1. If COx then CAx
2. If CAx then there is some y such that (NEy & Gyx)
3. If NAx then COx
4. There is some x such that x is u
5. NAu
6. COu (Conditional elimination from 3, 5)
7. CAu
8. There is some y such that (NEy and Gyu)(Conditional elimination from 2, 7)
9. If NEx then ~CAx
10. There is some y such that (NEy & Gyu & ~CAy)(Conditional elimination from 8, 9)
11. If there is some y such that (NEy & Gyn & ~CAy) then there is some z such that Ez and z = y.
12. If there is some y such that (NEy & Gyn & ~CAy & Ey)then there is some z such that Gz and y = z.
13. There is some y such that (NEy & Gyn & ~CAy & Ey). (Conditional elimination from 8, 11)
14. There is some y such that Gy. (Conditional elimination from 12, 13)

Key:

COx = x is contingent
CAx = x has a cause
NEx = x is necessary
Gyx = y grounds x
NAx = x is natural
Gx = x is God
Ex = x is eternal

I have added a few things to the argument. First, I have added the premise that the universe exists in premise 4. Second,I have added some of the steps that are obviously implicit in the argument. Third, I have added the premise that there existing some y such that (NEy & Gyu & ~CAy) implies that there is some y such that Ey. Fourth, I have added the premise that if there exists some y such that (NEy & Gyn & ~CAy & Ey) then there exists some y such that Gy.

As it stands, the argument looks valid. However, the argument is still problematic.

First, premise 1 is not known to be true. Contingent things, within a possible worlds view, are things which exist in a proper subset of possible worlds. The difference between x being necessary and x being contingent is that x being necessary implies x exists in every possible world where x being contingent implies x exists in some but not all possible worlds. As a result, x being contingent doesn't say anything about x having a cause. It might be the case that every contingent thing does happen to have a cause, but we cannot deduce it. At best we can use induction to support premise 1.

Second, based on how I interpret premise 2, premise 2 is false. Contingent things can be grounded in other contingent things. The existence of two hands on my body is grounded in my existing at all. If I am a contingent thing, and each of my parts are contingent, then the existence of two contingent things is grounded in the existence of one contingent thing.

Third, why should we believe that all natural things are contingent? This seems close to question begging against the naturalist. The naturalist simply believes that nothing supernatural exists. I see no reason to think that the naturalist cannot believe that necessary non supernatural beings exist. Even a materialist, a believer of a form of naturalism, can believe that there exists some fundamentally existent physical stuff. Relevant: http://exapologist.blogspot.ca/2012/07/recent-post-series-on-leibnizian.html

Fourth, why should we accept that there existing something that is non natural and necessary implies that there is something which is non natural, necessary AND eternal? Depending on how you define "Eternal", this premise will need some defending.

Fifth, why should we accept that there existing something that is non natural, necessary, eternal and is the cause of the universe implies that God exists? You seem to believe that the definition of God is simply that God is the cause of the world, is necessary and is eternal. But that definition is not quite what most people define God as. For instance, it says nothing about omnipotence, omniscience, moral characteristics, personhood, etc. It seems to me that an atheist, one who rejects what is commonly defined as theism, can accept the conclusion of the argument without committing themselves to an inconsistent set of beliefs.

Joe Hinman said...

Answer for IM

My response:
(1) I will grant this for the purpose of this discussion. However, is is not known to be true. There are things for which we can observe no cause.

I assume you mean Qm particles. that's the only example you can give and it's not true. We infer cause from correlation and Qm particles combine prior exiting particles to form virtual particles that's what they means. so "nothing' is not nothing.



(2) I do not accept this. Contingent things (if defined as things whose existence has a beginning in time) have a cause (by premise 1), but that cause could be anything. I do not grant that it must be a necessary thing.

this is a deductive argument man. We are going to deduce something we do that by arguing premises, p2 doesn't to embody the conclusion of the argument it only has to be true in itself, saying it could be anything is BS because by the end of the argument it will be apparent not true.




(3) I do not accept this. Of course, it depends on the definition of natural, but you haven't provided that.

give me a counter example. the proof is nothing g in nature is without a cause. I should have pointed out contingent means caused. give me an example of something g that is not caused. don't say QM cause I just disproved it.



(4) I do not grant that the universe has a beginning in time, and therefore that the universe is contingent. Space-time may have a beginning, but since time in intimately bound with space, it is incorrect to say that the universe has a beginning in time.

No it has a beginning with time not in time,. they begin together. that is convoluted to say that because space/time are linked then they aren't contingent. Space/time begins that is a good reason to assume it's contingent. we have no example of anything naturalistic that begins that does not have a cause..



(5) Since I reject premise 2, I reject this conclusion.

I proved your reasoning was bogus, see 2



(6) I assume that by "the origin" you mean the thing that causes the universe to exist.

right


That could be something that exists eternally, but there is no reason to assume that it must be a necessary thing. It could be something (other than God) that just happens to exist by brute fact. Some sort of timeless quantum vacuum, for instance.

yes sure it should be because the only alternative is an infinite regress and that is illogical. you just kicked the can down the road you will come to it again.


(7) Obviously, the existence of God does not follow without making some unjustified assumptions in the premises that lead up to this. Since that justification has not been provided, the conclusion is not warranted
\
I have demonstrated a justification for every assumption

Joe Hinman said...

April 30, 2016 at 9:34 AM
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Answer to Martyn Cornell part 1


Blogger Martyn Cornell said...
Have you actually read anything about this topic?

Metacrock (Joe)>>> Yes



Are you capable of polite discourse?

Metacrock (Joe)>>> I'll give it a shot



Metacrock (Joe)before on I"M's blog>>> First you have no reason to suppose an immaterial from of being could not exist or create.

MC
I can suppose all sorts of things, but without evidence I would be foolish to rely upon pure supposition to argue anything as actual fact. Second, all beings we actually have knowledge of are material. Positing “an immaterial form of being” to get you out of trouble is pure sophistry: “Deus ex nihilo”. Third, “an immaterial being” is surely as nonsensical as “a colourless green” or “a silent noise”.

Metacrock (Joe)>>>
god is not "a being" but the basis of all being. He's the "ground of being" or being itself. Thus the sort of empirical knowledge thought category you want to apply to things in the world have no meaning for God.

(Joe)Before>>> Secondly being material or immaterial has nothing to do with it. Although it does seem all matter is cotangent so that's a reason to think the origin o all can't be material.

MC How can the origin of the material be immaterial? You can’t even define the immaterial, let alone explain how it could act with the material. All the things we know act with the material are themselves material.

Metacrock (Joe)>>> If we can't define it then you are stuck for a reason to doubt that it could be. Immaterial origin is logical given the fact that we are talking about the basis upon which matter exists. That would imply something like physical laws or law of nature. That indicates ordering principle and mind is the best basis for that.


Joe Hinman said...

MC part 2

MC Thirdly,

the start of the material world had no cause;


Metacrock (Joe)>>> we don't know that. That's based upon Quantum theory. But that entails the false use of nothing. It would be more logical to assume there is since all natural things have causes.

(Joe)>>> all material things have causes so attributing the universe to no cause is foolish,

But the fact is, all we know is, “all the material things we know so far have cause.” That is not the same as “all material things have causes.” It’s the “all swans are white” argument: a perfectly reasonable believe for Europeans, until they reached Australia.

Metacrock (Joe)>>> we are talking about what assumption we should make not absolute indisputable knowledge, if we had that we would not need an argument.



MC or there was, in fact, no start.

Metacrock (Joe)>>> Big Bang is still standard model. You say "in fact' how do you know that it is a act?


Metacrock (Joe)>>> science says there was. it's called the big bang.

MC That looks to have been the start in our universe. But since we cannot look beyond the Big Bang, it might, for example, have been the Big Bounce - a position that, while (currently) impossible to prove or disprove, at least requires less illogical imagining than “an immaterial form of being”. And the eternal multiverse is at least a more logical and believable solution than “an immaterial form of being creating the material”.

Metacrock (Joe)>>> you are begging the question as I pointed out you commit category error expecting being itself to fall under the same rules as things incretion we can make assumptions based upon what we know such as all naturalistic things need causes(as far as we know) but to then say that this thing from e\beyond our field of understanding must be like everything we understand merely because we can't think about it otherwise (do you even have a reason?) illogical.

In trying to assert the illogical of God based upon contingencies we know is merely begging the question because you are using the position you take to prove the position you take. X is not logical because I don't accept X.

MC Turning to your version of the cosmological argument,

Metacrock (Joe)>>> that was it. the arguments I've been making are from my CA

MC (3) All natural things are contingent - all the natural things we know are contingent. “All swans are white” again. So that knocks out your (4)

Metacrock (Joe)>>> they are contingent because they all need causes, when there are no counter examples. Moreover the basis of naturalism is rooted in naturalistic cause and effect. That means it's perfectly logical to assume that part of being natural is to be caused.



MC (5) the universe requires a necessity upon which its existence is grounded The only necessity for the universe is that it exists. You suppose a beginning for all existence is necessary. You haven’t proved that to be the case, nor can you until you can show that there was nothing at all before the Big Bang.


Metacrock (Joe)>>> Wrong. The naturalistic universe, not all of being. God is being and God is not caused. the existence of the universe is not necessary there doesn't have to be one there is no basis in physics for saying there is.

April 30, 2016 at 11:17 AM
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Joe Hinman said...


I'' get t o Rayan's argument today.

im-skeptical said...

I assume you mean Qm particles. that's the only example you can give and it's not true. We infer cause from correlation and Qm particles combine prior exiting particles to form virtual particles that's what they means. so "nothing' is not nothing.
- Physics does not infer that virtual particles are a combination of prior existing particles. Maybe you do.

this is a deductive argument man. We are going to deduce something we do that by arguing premises, p2 doesn't to embody the conclusion of the argument it only has to be true in itself, saying it could be anything is BS because by the end of the argument it will be apparent not true.
- If I understand you, your justification for (2) is that the conclusion of the argument requires it. So your argument is circular. Nowhere do you make an independent case for this premise.

give me an example of something g that is not caused. don't say QM cause I just disproved it.
- No, you didn't. But anything eternal is not caused. Therefore, anything outside od space-time that may exist as a brute fact would qualify. It doesn't have to be God.

No it has a beginning with time not in time,. they begin together.
- Our concept of 'beginning' is based on time.

I proved your reasoning was bogus, see 2
- your reasoning is invalid.

yes sure it should be because the only alternative is an infinite regress and that is illogical. you just kicked the can down the road you will come to it again.
- No. The alternative is something that exists eternally. It doesn't have to be God.

Joe Hinman said...

Ryan part 1

hey Ryan great to see you here. thanks for coming

April 30, 2016 at 11:17 AM
Delete
Blogger Ryan M said...
1. If COx then CAx
2. If CAx then there is some y such that (NEy & Gyx)
3. If NAx then COx
4. There is some x such that x is u
5. NAu
6. COu (Conditional elimination from 3, 5)
7. CAu
8. There is some y such that (NEy and Gyu)(Conditional elimination from 2, 7)
9. If NEx then ~CAx
10. There is some y such that (NEy & Gyu & ~CAy)(Conditional elimination from 8, 9)
11. If there is some y such that (NEy & Gyn & ~CAy) then there is some z such that Ez and z = y.
12. If there is some y such that (NEy & Gyn & ~CAy & Ey)then there is some z such that Gz and y = z.
13. There is some y such that (NEy & Gyn & ~CAy & Ey). (Conditional elimination from 8, 11)
14. There is some y such that Gy. (Conditional elimination from 12, 13)

Key:

COx = x is contingent
CAx = x has a cause
NEx = x is necessary
Gyx = y grounds x
NAx = x is natural
Gx = x is God
Ex = x is eternal

I have added a few things to the argument. First, I have added the premise that the universe exists in premise 4. Second,I have added some of the steps that are obviously implicit in the argument. Third, I have added the premise that there existing some y such that (NEy & Gyu & ~CAy) implies that there is some y such that Ey. Fourth, I have added the premise that if there exists some y such that (NEy & Gyn & ~CAy & Ey) then there exists some y such that Gy.


I have a problem. I have a problem with people adding to my arguments. then you are not attacking my argument but yours, I should not have to defend an argument that I did not make. Technically that's a straw man



As it stands, the argument looks valid. However, the argument is still problematic.

First, premise 1 is not known to be true. Contingent things, within a possible worlds view, are things which exist in a proper subset of possible worlds.


p1 is absolutely true. It's true by definition that's the basic concept of contingent. Flew actually defines it as something that doesn't have to have come to be. It is the case that in our understanding of reality that means things with cause since the cause could have been altered or missed.



The difference between x being necessary and x being contingent is that x being necessary implies x exists in every possible world where x being contingent implies x exists in some but not all possible worlds. As a result, x being contingent doesn't say anything about x having a cause. It might be the case that every contingent thing does happen to have a cause, but we cannot deduce it. At best we can use induction to support premise 1.


I think I can document that this is one use of the term that is valid. But more to the point the definition you just described is that of a caused phenomena all causes phenomena could be not caused. In other words s's that may or may not be in all possible worlds are caused.


Joe Hinman said...

Ryan part 2

Second, based on how I interpret premise 2, premise 2 is false. Contingent things can be grounded in other contingent things. The existence of two hands on my body is grounded in my existing at all. If I am a contingent thing, and each of my parts are contingent, then the existence of two contingent things is grounded in the existence of one contingent thing.

P2 does not say that everything cause is directly and immediately caused by a necessary cause. It is true that everything natural has a cause and those causes are necessary relative to that thing but not necessarily in the long run, But if you go back far enough you run into final cause or ICR. ICR ISILLOGOICAL SO THERE IS A FIMNAL CAUSE.





Third, why should we believe that all natural things are contingent? This seems close to question begging against the naturalist. The naturalist simply believes that nothing supernatural exists. I see no reason to think that the naturalist cannot believe that necessary non supernatural beings exist. Even a materialist, a believer of a form of naturalism, can believe that there exists some fundamentally existent physical stuff. Relevant: http://exapologist.blogspot.ca/2012/07/recent-post-series-on-leibnizian.html


no atheist today can use the term SN in a meaningful way, The doctrine was hijacked in the enlightenment an even Christians don't understand it. If the term has any meaning at all if there is a meaningful distinction between N and SN then being caused would be part of that. When Scheeben defines nature he uses the Latin natura and the Greek Hamousios defined as life from life. in other words causes.

The true Christian concept of the supernatural

Fourth, why should we accept that there existing something that is non natural and necessary implies that there is something which is non natural, necessary AND eternal? Depending on how you define "Eternal", this premise will need some defending.

The argument says it bluntly the naturalistic origin not enough to account t for origins. contingencies are pinned upon necessities but anh infinite string of thyem is impossible..

Fifth, why should we accept that there existing something that is non natural, necessary, eternal and is the cause of the universe implies that God exists? You seem to believe that the definition of God is simply that God is the cause of the world, is necessary and is eternal.

that is essentially the same question and it get's the same answer. each premise is logically related to the previous one.



But that definition is not quite what most people define God as.

theology I not based upon democracy. truth is not changed by public opinion.,.



For instance, it says nothing about omnipotence, omniscience, moral characteristics, personhood, etc. It seems to me that an atheist, one who rejects what is commonly defined as theism, can accept the conclusion of the argument without committing themselves to an inconsistent set of beliefs.

show me the officials Christian doctrine that says we have to talk about that? show me the creed or the council that says God is a person? You are using an argument that is grounded in atheist apologetics atheism trying to dictate to believers what they believe so as to install a straw man in Christian doctrine. As it so happens the being itself idea of God is in Vatican II and it goes back to the 6th century. In fact it can be traced to the LXX and the Intertetsememtal period.

the basic concept that I have sketched out doesn't preclude those things, we could argue that most of them would be necessary to have the sort of God I am talking about





April 30, 2016 at 11:35 AM
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Joe Hinman said...

my rebuttal to IMS rebuttal (1)



April 30, 2016 at 12:26 PM
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Blogger im-skeptical said...
I assume you mean Qm particles. that's the only example you can give and it's not true. We infer cause from correlation and Qm particles combine prior exiting particles to form virtual particles that's what they means. so "nothing' is not nothing.
- Physics does not infer that virtual particles are a combination of prior existing particles. Maybe you do.

Yes but they do sorry.

QM particles do not prove Universe from nothing.

[Gordon Kane, “Are Virtual Particles Really Constantly Popping In and Out of existence? Or Are They Merely a Mathematical Bookkeeping Device For Quantum Mechanics?” Scientific American, (Oct. 9, 2006) on line version URL: http://www.scientific american.com/article/are-virtual-particles-rea/ accessed 10/12/15]



[Meta before]
this is a deductive argument man. We are going to deduce something we do that by arguing premises, p2 doesn't to embody the conclusion of the argument it only has to be true in itself, saying it could be anything is BS because by the end of the argument it will be apparent not true.



- If I understand you, your justification for (2) is that the conclusion of the argument requires it. So your argument is circular. Nowhere do you make an independent case for this premise.

I said the conclusion is deduced from the premises. if the premises are true and the conclusion has been deduced properly-- that is logically-- then the argument must be true. I sassed P2 doesn't have to embody the conclusion in other words when we are arguing P2 I don't have to prove the conclusion of the argument a whole to prose that premise.


[Me before]give me an example of something g that is not caused. don't say QM cause I just disproved it.


- No, you didn't. But anything eternal is not caused. Therefore, anything outside od space-time that may exist as a brute fact would qualify. It doesn't have to be God.

fair enough I had not done so yet but I have now. look at the oinks above

Me before
No it has a beginning with time not in time,. they begin together.
- Our concept of 'beginning' is based on time.

I proved your reasoning was bogus, see 2
- your reasoning is invalid.
\
science says time began with the big bang, that is space/time they begin together, look it up it's common knowledge so that is not invalid it's physics.

all the BS about no beginning is highly theoretical and has not been proven. atheists refer to so much they all started assuming it's a dome deal.

***that all contingencies require necessities (P2) the standard definition of contingent. there is no such thing as a contingent not related to a necessity nor could there be. that is what the word means. even in Flews sense of the word is refers to something not always true in every possible world., that only means that possible worlds are mad up to illustrate what contingency means because it means dependence upon prior condition.






[Me before]
yes sure it should be because the only alternative is an infinite regress and that is illogical. you just kicked the can down the road you will come to it again.


- No. The alternative is something that exists eternally. It doesn't have to be God.


yes sorry but it does. by definition.,at least eternal is one atributre that is an attribute of God. God is the eternal necessary aspect of being. anything that fits that has to be God because there can only be one thing that is eternal necessary ground of being.\.

you can't give me an example of anything else that is.




April 30, 2016 at 12:33 PM
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Joe Hinman said...

Gordon Kane, “Are Virtual Particles Really Constantly Popping In and Out of existence? Or Are They Merely a Mathematical Bookkeeping Device For Quantum Mechanics?” Scientific American, (Oct. 9, 2006) on line version URL: accessed 10/12/15]

link

Ryan M said...

With respect to the definition of "God", there is no single definition that will be acceptable to everyone we call a "theist". However, there are common properties to what is generally held to be "theism" that consequently defines what is commonly known as an "atheist". Theists, generally, define God as omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, immaterial, etc. As a result, someone known as an atheist in general is someone who rejects that the claim "God exists" is true where "God" denotes what is described above. That is relevant to your argument since you define "God" as something which many atheists might have no issue with. There existing something that is non natural, eternal, necessarily existent, might very well not be something that would leave the average atheist with an inconsistent set of beliefs. It is probably correct that those properties you list are essential properties for what people generally call "God", but at best it leaves you with an incomplete starting point for theism. You get yourself close to God, but not quite there unless you can argue for the additional properties necessary for God.

With respect to contingency, I think I understand your point now. However, saying all contingencies must ultimately be grounded in a necessary being needs to be defended by an additional argument. As you likely know, arguments from contingency are still debated among philosophers. Many philosophers think it cannot be deduced that a necessary being exists from any a posteriori argument from contingency (Some think infinite regression is possible), and many do not think it can be deduced a priori since our knowledge of contingent things comes from experience. It would be best to have a sub argument to show that contingency ultimately is grounded in a necessary being since you're basically assuming the soundness of contingency arguments as a premise in your argument.

With respect to natural origins, you're right that the argument states plainly that all natural things have causes since it states that all natural things are contingent. But my question is why should we accept the truth of those premises. Remember that stating something as a premise does not imply that the premise is true. Sometimes a premise is self evident so it requires no defense, but other times a premise is not self evident and consequently will require a defense. Your premises about natural origins need a defense in my opinion.

Ryan M said...

Why can only God be an eternal, necessarily existent ground of being? Why can there not be a necessarily existent, eternal multiverse? Or why can there not be necessarily existent, eternal material stuff, such as quarks?

http://exapologist.blogspot.ca/2014/01/the-cosmological-argument-and-multiverse.html

Exapologist has some relevant thoughts on the subject.

Joe Hinman said...

Ryan M said...

With respect to the definition of "God", there is no single definition that will be acceptable to everyone we call a "theist".

true but that just makes it all the more absurd to find fault with mine., After all I am defending my beliefs. that's what I believe in who is to say I'm not right? you have to deal with it.,



However, there are common properties to what is generally held to be "theism" that consequently defines what is commonly known as an "atheist". Theists, generally, define God as omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, immaterial, etc.


my view does not rule out any of that.




With respect to contingency, I think I understand your point now. However, saying all contingencies must ultimately be grounded in a necessary being needs to be defended by an additional argument.

I didn't say in a being, I said a necessity we can construe that necessity is worthy of the appellation "God" but does not have to be part of the definition of contingent.



As you likely know, arguments from contingency are still debated among philosophers. Many philosophers think it cannot be deduced that a necessary being exists from any a posteriori argument from contingency

But applies to proof. I'm talking about warrant, best explanation not proof. I apologize if I did not make that clear, I'm so used to it I forget I have to explain it to people if I have not argued 'god arguments with them before.


(Some think infinite regression is possible),

I know that just makes for more fun arguing



and many do not think it can be deduced a priori since our knowledge of contingent things comes from experience.

Since there are no counter examples it's a reasonable assumption.



Joe Hinman said...

Ryan part 2

It would be best to have a sub argument to show that contingency ultimately is grounded in a necessary being since you're basically assuming the soundness of contingency arguments as a premise in your argument.

sound advice, I'll get to work on it. That's the meaning of the term. Before Kripke the scholastic rendition had a causal aspect to the concept. Possible worlds were invented to illustrate contingency

Garth Kemerling Ph.D, U. Iowa

"In causal relations, a necessary condition for the occurence of an event is a state of affairs without which the event cannot happen, while a sufficient condition is a state of affairs that guarantees that it will happen. Thus, for example: the presence of oxygen is a necessary condition for combustion, and the flow of electrical current is a sufficient condition for the induction of a magnetic field."

he cites:
Recommended Reading: Jules Vuillemin, Necessity or Contingency? (C S L I, 1995); Colin McGinn, Logical Properties (Oxford, 2001); Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Clarendon, 1989); and Margaret Dauler Wilson, Leibniz' Doctrine of Necessary Truth (Harvard, 1984).

My argument is about cu8sal relations. we can also add Hartshorne as I have seen him define necessity/contingency by causal aspects.


With respect to natural origins, you're right that the argument states plainly that all natural things have causes since it states that all natural things are contingent. But my question is why should we accept the truth of those premises. Remember that stating something as a premise does not imply that the premise is true. Sometimes a premise is self evident so it requires no defense, but other times a premise is not self evident and consequently will require a defense. Your premises about natural origins need a defense in my opinion.


I've defended them, read hother guys arguments
May 1, 2016 at 8:02 AM

Ryan M said...
Why can only God be an eternal, necessarily existent ground of being? Why can there not be a necessarily existent, eternal multiverse? Or why can there not be necessarily existent, eternal material stuff, such as quarks?

http://exapologist.blogspot.ca/2014/01/the-cosmological-argument-and-multiverse.html

Exapologist has some relevant thoughts on the subject.
May 1, 2016 at 8:13 AM

God is the ground of being. That's the concept. Popular piety over emphasizes the father metaphor but there basic concept of God in the Christian tradition by the major thinkers of the tradition has always been the ground being the basis of all things. It's not just about some guy named God it's about the basis of all things, the transcendental signified. There can only be one, Look at what Heidegger calls being itself., you can't two being itselfs. that would be like having two maximally great beings.

God is not a being but being itself. He's outside the category by which multiplicity is. for example multiverses are part of being. So they are not over God ontologically but aspects of God's reality they are the things and God is the eternal necessary aspect.

im-skeptical said...

Joe,

My reply to your latest response to me:

Yes but they do sorry.

QM particles do not prove Universe from nothing.

- My original statement is in reference to whether everything must have a cause, not whether something comes from nothing. Virtual particles come from apparently uncaused fluctuations in the quantum vacuum, which is otherwise known as nothing. There is disagreement as to whether the quantum vacuum actually is something, but that's not the point. There is no known cause for these things. And I think you misunderstand the Scientific American article you are citing.

I said the conclusion is deduced from the premises. if the premises are true and the conclusion has been deduced properly-- that is logically-- then the argument must be true. I sassed P2 doesn't have to embody the conclusion in other words when we are arguing P2 I don't have to prove the conclusion of the argument a whole to prose that premise.
- OK. It's hard to figure out what you are saying, sometimes. So you are asserting that P2 is true. You still haven't provided any substantiation for it. I have no reason to believe it, and I don't.

fair enough I had not done so yet but I have now. look at the oinks above
- The Scientific American article? That has little to do with the question of whether there can be something other than God that exists outside of space-time. But Physics postulates that the big bang itself is like a fluctuation in the quantum vacuum, which implies that the quantum vacuum (if it is actually something) exists outside of space-time. This concept supports the idea that the universe simply sprang into existence, no cause required or implied, and that God had nothing to do with it.

yes sorry but it does. by definition.,at least eternal is one atributre that is an attribute of God. God is the eternal necessary aspect of being. anything that fits that has to be God because there can only be one thing that is eternal necessary ground of being.\.

you can't give me an example of anything else that is.

- Your definition of God begs the question. And I just did give you an example of the alternative.


Joe Hinman said...

My answer to IMS second rebuttal (1 od 2)




Me before
QM particles do not prove Universe from nothing.

IMS
- My original statement is in reference to whether everything must have a cause, not whether something comes from nothing. Virtual particles come from apparently uncaused fluctuations in the quantum vacuum, which is otherwise known as nothing. There is disagreement as to whether the quantum vacuum actually is something, but that's not the point. There is no known cause for these things. And I think you misunderstand the Scientific American article you are citing.

That constitutes a prior condition that has to be explained in terms of it's cause and thus is not an explanation. It's not nothing it's something. everything have a cause and something from nothing are obviously two sides to the same coin,

Me before

I said the conclusion is deduced from the premises. if the premises are true and the conclusion has been deduced properly-- that is logically-- then the argument must be true. I sassed P2 doesn't have to embody the conclusion in other words when we are arguing P2 I don't have to prove the conclusion of the argument a whole to prose that premise.


IMS

- OK. It's hard to figure out what you are saying, sometimes. So you are asserting that P2 is true. You still haven't provided any substantiation for it. I have no reason to believe it, and I don't.\

[p2 =All contingencies require necessities to ground them] yes I did substantiate. see my quote from Garth Kemerling Ph.D, U. Iowa

"In causal relations, a necessary condition for the occurence of an event is a state of affairs without which the event cannot happen, while a sufficient condition is a state of affairs that guarantees that it will happen. Thus, for example: the presence of oxygen is a necessary condition for combustion, and the flow of electrical current is a sufficient condition for the induction of a magnetic field."

He is answering definition for "Necessity/contingency" you will see then links like that a lot. It's definitional. contingent means dependent. a contingency is a thing that results from prior conditions that make it necessary given those conditions.



me
fair enough I had not done so yet but I have now. look at the oinks above


Joe Hinman said...

My answer to IMS second rebuttal 2 of 2

IMS

- The Scientific American article? That has little to do with the question of whether there can be something other than God that exists outside of space-time.


do you just not understand the concept of deduction> you don't just put up a fact and here my fact I'm right, no, you deduce. DEDUCTION you draw conclusion based upon thinking, so I that article supply the basis that I need from to deduce the answer Godwise, it doesn't have to mention god to supply the fact from whichto deduce an answer

that article says virtual particles come from other particles therefore it's not without a cause not something from nothing.,



IMS


But Physics postulates that the big bang itself is like a fluctuation in the quantum vacuum, which implies that the quantum vacuum (if it is actually something) exists outside of space-time. This concept supports the idea that the universe simply sprang into existence, no cause required or implied, and that God had nothing to do with it.


except it's not nothing so how did it get there and what makes it produce something else? since it's naturalistic we are justified in assuming it must have a cause. since it's contingent 9becaiuse it's caused) we are justified in assuming there but be a necessary cause.


me before

yes sorry but it does. by definition.,at least eternal is one atributre that is an attribute of God. God is the eternal necessary aspect of being. anything that fits that has to be God because there can only be one thing that is eternal necessary ground of being..




IMS

you can't give me an example of anything else that is.


Of course not! man you do not get the concept at all. God is off scale don't you get that you can't compare him to some BS in nature and expect that to limit his reality or is being, God is not another thing in creation he is the basis of creation, He's not another thing to weigh he's here scale,.

try to get this analogy now, you can't say "show me another example of something like science that proves science is not true. or you can't give me an example of a another unified field or another laws of physics,







IMS

- Your definition of God begs the question. And I just did give you an example of the alternative.



No you didn't. you mean asserting multiverse> Multiverse is creation, that can't be an alternative to the ground of being because a product of being. It's a collection of contingent things so it is contingent and thus it's begging the question because it's taken out by p3.

Joe Hinman said...

IMS tell me what about my notion of God is begging the question, tell me what you think begging the question means.

Martyn Cornell said...

god is not "a being" but the basis of all being. He's the "ground of being" or being itself. Thus the sort of empirical knowledge thought category you want to apply to things in the world have no meaning for God.

You obviously think that all means something. It doesn’t. In fact it’s just the sort of circular argument you’re accusing me of: “God exists because being exists and the ground of being is god.”

“In trying to assert the illogical of God based upon contingencies we know is merely begging the question because you are using the position you take to prove the position you take. X is not logical because I don't accept X.”

You appear to not understand my position. I don’t argue that god is not logical. I argue that there is no proof god is necessary.

“it's perfectly logical to assume that part of being natural is to be caused.”

No. You simply can’t make that claim.

God is being and God is not caused.

Meaningless

the existence of the universe is not necessary there doesn't have to be one there is no basis in physics for saying there is.

Oh, indeed. But as the consequences of denying the universe is real are likely to be very painful, and that pain will certainly seem to be real, it’s probably best to act as if the universe is real too.

“contingencies are pinned upon necessities but an infinite string of them is impossible.”

Not true. I know you believe you’ve proved this, but you haven’t.

Anonymous said...

Atheism is a self-contradiction. Forcing atheism down your kids' throats is bad for them because it turns them into whiny bullies who attack religious people 24/7 for no reason other than the fact that they have different beliefs, then turn around and complain about "secularphobia" and blame everyone else except for themselves when people dislike them. It's hilariously ironic, though, because the big bang theory, evolution, and atheism in general are all fairytales for children, but, like I said, atheism turns kids (and adults too, for that matter) into whiny bullies. Atheism is like The Cat in the Hat movie: it's stupid, boring, illogical, pointless, it makes no sense, and it's for impressionable children, but at the same time, it's inappropriate for children. It's weird.